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NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING
COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LITIGATION SECTION
STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF NEW YORK
MARRIOTT MARQUIS HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY
THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1991
6:00 P.M.
"Federal Habeas Review of New York Convictions:
Relieving The Tensions"
Good afternoon and welcome to our program, "Federal Habeas
Review of New York Convictions:

Relieving the Tensions."

Before

you are the members of the State/Federal Judicial Council of New
York.

They will constitute the panel for this program.

introduce them to you now.

I

[from left to right] -- Justice

Theodore R. Kupferman of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department; Justice Edwin Kassoff, Presiding
Justice of Appellate Term, New York Supreme Court, Second and
Eleventh Judicial Districts; and Judge Charles P. Sifton of the
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
Judge Fritz W. Alexander, II of the New York Court of Appeals who
was scheduled to be on the program, has the flu and cannot
attend.

I am Judge Roger J. Miner of the United states Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chairman of the State/Federal
Judicial Council of New York, and Moderator of this forum.

We

are grateful to the New York State Bar Association and its
Section on Commercial and Federal Litigation for co-sponsoring
this symposium as part of the annual meeting of the New York
State Bar Association.
First, a word about the State/Federal Judicial Council of
New York.

The Council exists to promote and harmonize the

relationship between state and federal courts in New York and to

minimize any conflicts that may develop from the operation of the
dual system of courts in this state.

We seek to maintain a

continuous dialogue on all joint problems in order to improve and
expedite the administration of justice by the state and federal
courts.

Among other accomplishments, our Council has handled the

scheduling conflicts of attorneys practicing in both systems,
arranged for the sharing of court facilities, and participated in
the establishment of the mechanism now in place for certifying to
the New York Court of Appeals questions of state law presented to
federal courts.

We have sponsored joint programs for the

exchange of views on such matters of mutual interest as the
individual assignment system, jury selection, attorney sanctions
and criminal sentencing.
Our program tonight deals with a subject that has been a
constant source of friction over the years between state and
federal courts -- the review of New York criminal convictions in
habeas corpus proceedings brought in federal courts.

Many

members of the New York judiciary think that the dual court
system goes awry when a single federal district judge orders the
release or retrial of an incarcerated defendant whose case has
been reviewed and considered by as many as 13 state judges.

The

statistics demonstrate, however, that the granting of such relief
is a rare event.

First of all, filings of federal habeas

challenges to state court convictions do not constitute a
significant part of the national federal caseload.

Of the

233,529 district court filings for the 12 month period ended June
30, 1989, only 10,554 represented habeas challenges to state
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court convictions.

This is less than 5% of the national filings

in federal district courts.

For the same period, there were

16,974 civil cases filed in the New York federal district courts,
and 677, or about 4% of these, were habeas challenges to New York
convictions.

During the last five years, district court filings

of habeas challenges to New York convictions have been fairly
level, ranging from a low of 663 to a high of 758.

The last

time-study of the federal court system revealed that the total
number of judicial hours devoted to state habeas petitions in the
district courts in the entire nation averaged 1.3% of all
judicial time.

While there were several hundred different

categories of suits in the time-study, habeas cases obviously do
not represent a major share of federal judicial time.
The reported decisions of the New York federal district
courts show four petitions granted in 1990, six each in the years
1988 and 1989, seven in 1987 and three in 1986.

Among the

reported decisions issued by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1990, there were only 11 state habeas cases.

District court

judgments were affirmed in eight of the cases, reversed with
directions for entry of judgment for petitioner in one case and
remanded for further proceedings in two cases.

In 1989, seven

judgments were affirmed in the Second Circuit and five were
remanded for further proceedings.

Habeas cases have even less of

an impact on appellate caseloads than they do on district court
caseloads.

It is estimated that state court judgments of
~%

conviction are disturbed in only

filed nationwide in any given year.
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to 1% of all habeas cases

Despite the fact that there are comparatively few habeas
cases in the federal system and even fewer grants of relief, the
tension remains.
the tension.

Some recent decisions seem to have exacerbated

No less a figure than our own Justice Kupferman,

dissenting in a 1990 decision in his court, People v. Kin-Kan,
wrote:
It is unseemly for seven Judges of the New York
State Court system, without a dissent, to be overruled
by one Judge in the federal system simply because of a
different subjective view of the applicable
constitutional principle and the balancing of the
defendant's right to a public trial versus the danger
to a witness.
The majority in Kin-Kan decided that the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of a district court determination, made
in the case of a co-defendant, that the sixth amendment right to
a public trial had been violated by the closure of the courtroom
during accomplice testimony.

The defendant and the co-defendant

had been tried together, and the habeas grant to the co-defendant
had been affirmed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The

majority wrote:
It is no longer open to us to accept the People's
invitation to find error in Judge Sand's conclusion
that the state court proceeding at the same trial fell
below federal constitutional standards. As properly
asserted by defendant Kin, those arguments would lie
only by way of reargument before the Second Circuit or
by application for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
Perhaps our colleague will tell us a little more about that case
when his time to speak comes.

I was particularly offended by

that part of his dissent in which he noted that a different panel
of the Second Circuit may have come to a different conclusion.
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As authority for that dubious proposition, he cited two copyright
opinions, one of which was written by me.
Federal law requires substantial deference to state courts
in criminal matters.

State remedies must be exhausted before a

federal habeas petition will be considered.
findings are presumed to be correct.

State court factual

The Stone v. Powell Rule

denies any challenge on fourth amendment grounds when the state
has provided the opportunity for a full and fair litigation of
the fourth amendment claim.

As one commentator has written of

federal habeas, "the courts are fond of extolling its virtues at
length before denying relief.
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Nevertheless, the tension

continues between state and federal courts in this area.

We hope

that our discussion this afternoon will help to relieve the
tension between judiciaries.

That is our purpose.

We intend, as

part of our discussion, to review some of the recent cases in
which challenges to New York convictions were sustained and the
writ allowed.

Our program includes a large block of time for

questions and comments from the judges and the panel and the
lawyers in the audience.

According to our format, each judge on

the panel will make a 10 minute presentation.

Following that, I

will open the floor to questions and comments but will ask that
they be directed through me.
I start the discussion by making some observations on some
recent cases in which habeas challenges were sustained.

Between

1988 and 1990, federal constitutional challenges to state court
convictions in New York were sustained on a variety of grounds.
In Harper v. Kelly, the trial court was found to have violated
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the sixth amendment right to confrontation by curtailing crossexamination regarding the emotional state of the victim.

The

federal court held that the petitioner's ability to probe the
reliability of the victim as eye witness had been denied.

In

Reddy v. Coombe, the statements of the defendants were found not
to fall within the old interlocking confession exception to the
Bruton rule.

In Fullan v. Commissioner, the federal court dealt

with the denial of a free trial transcript for appeal, holding
that the free transcript must be provided despite the fact that
the petitioner was represented by an attorney hired by family and
friends.
In Innes v. Dalsheim, the federal court determined that the
trial judge had not made it clear in the plea hearing that the
plea could not be withdrawn.

The conclusion was that there was

no intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights with
full knowledge of the consequences.
was found in Sanders v. Sullivan.

A violation of due process
The circuit court there held

that such a violation occurs when a credible recantation of the
testimony in question would probably change the outcome of the
trial but the state nevertheless leaves the conviction in place.
The circuit court remanded to determine the credibility of the
victim's recantation.
The circuit court also remanded for an evidentiary hearing
in the case of Escalera v. Coombe.

In this case the petitioner's

brother had not been allowed to testify because he was not on the
list of alibi witnesses as required by the New York statute.

The

circuit court held that if the attorney had not acted willfully
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in excluding the brother's name from the list, habeas should be
granted.

In Rosario v. Kulhman, the trial court's refusal to

allow the transcript of impeaching testimony from a codefendant's trial was held to be constitutional error where it
was found that all possible efforts had been made to locate the
impeaching witness.
More than any other type of case, cases involving delay in
the state court system form the basis for successful habeas
challenges in New York.

In Elcock v. Henderson, the petitioner

was convicted of murder and assault in 1978.

He filed a notice

of appeal shortly after his conviction, but his appeal was not
decided in the Appellate Division until 1987.

The Second Circuit

returned the case to the district court for findings on the issue
of a due process claim for unconscionable delay.

Exhaustion of

state remedies was not required in view of the nine year period
of delay.

In Brooks v. Jones, there was an eight year delay in

prosecution of the appeal due to inexcusable neglect on the part
of a series of assigned counsel.

In Mathis v. Hood, a delay of

six years in perfecting the appeal as the result of the neglect
of counsel was characterized by the Second Circuit as "shocking"
as well as not unusual in the First and Second Departments.

On

remand, the district court directed that the prisoner be released
pending a new appeal.
I close my overview of cases in which habeas was granted
with an opinion I wrote in 1988.

The case is Jenkins v. Coombe.

The attorney originally assigned to represent the petitioner in
his state appeal was relieved because of a conflict of interest
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arising from his representation of a co-defendant.

The court

appointed another attorney to represent petitioner on appeal and
that attorney moved to be relieved within six months of his
appointment.

The motion was denied, and the attorney thereafter

filed a clearly inadequate five page brief containing but one
point.

That point consisted of three paragraphs attacking the

identification testimony.

Petitioner then lodged a complaint

against the attorney, who then unsuccessfully moved to be
relieved.

The application was granted, but the Appellate

Division failed to provide substitute counsel.
Petitioner then filed a 51 page supplemental pro se brief
advancing the same three arguments that had been successful for
his co-defendant, together with three arguments of his own.

The

Appellate Division took the case under advisement and determined
that the points which the co-defendant was successful on did not
apply to petitioner.

In the habeas case, the district court

wrote that petitioner had the benefit of effective assistance of
counsel, even though it was not his own counsel.

On appeal, I

wrote that the petitioner was not provided with effective
appellate counsel and that he really had no counsel or, at best,
nominal counsel to represent him on appeal.
It seems to me that much of our tension can be relieved by
the assignment in state courts of competent counsel who can
perfect appeals in a timely manner.
One final note.

In Harris v. Reed, decided in 1989, the

Supreme Court determined that a procedural default in a state
court will not bar consideration of a federal substantive claim
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on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment
in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests
on the state procedural bar.

To get past a state procedural bar

in a habeas case, the petitioner must of course show cause for
the procedural default as well as prejudice flowing from the
alleged constitutional violation.

The cause requirement may be

dispensed with in the case of a strong showing of probable
factual innocence.

:~~~

The Harris decision overrules Second Circuit

precedent that silence in the state court in the face of both
substantive and procedural claims would be taken to mean that the
state court relied on the procedural bar.

It is now especially

important for the Appellate Division to indicate the basis for a
decision in criminal appeals.
contributes to the tension.

Affirmance with no opinion just
In any event, perhaps habeas corpus

challenges to state court convictions should be restricted to
claims that go to the reliability of the guilt-determining
process and, just perhaps, only prisoners who urge that their
guilt was not properly established should be entitled to the
writ.
I call upon Justice Kupferman for his remarks.
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